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One of the improvements in the 1976 Copyright Act was
the specific recognition of choreographic works as copyrightable
material. The Act's focus on the protection of economic rights,
however, fails to address the primary interest of the dance
community in the preservation of "moral rights" in a work. The
author examines the unique concerns of choreographers, and
concludes that it is customary, and not legislative or judicial,
law that continues to provide the best protection of choreogra-
phers' artistic interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, American law had always been content to treat
dance as the black sheep of the arts. Although both Congress and
the courts long ago recognized the cultural and historical impor-
tance of performing arts such as drama and music,' neither Con-
gress nor the courts were willing to grant dance its due. Congress
effectively denied statutory copyright protection to choreographic
works by repeatedly refusing to include choreography in the list of
copyrightable works.2 The courts likewise had a long history of de-
nying protection to choreographic works.3
The enactment of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976' forced
lawmakers and lawyers to rethink their position on the legal status
of choreography. With the express extension of statutory copy-
right privileges to "choreographic works and pantomimes," 6 dance
was no longer a mere stepchild of drama. Dance had achieved le-
1. Musical compositions were first recognized under the Copyright Revision Act of
1831. Act of 1831, Feb. 3, c. 16, 4 Stat. 436. Dramatic works were first recognized under the
Copyright Revision Act of 1856. Act of 1856, Aug. 18, c. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
2. A number of copyright revision bills were introduced but rejected from 1924 to 1940.
These included the Dallinger Bill of 1924, the Perkins Bill of 1925, the Vestal Bill of 1931,
the Duffy Bill of 1935, and the Sirovich Bill of 1936. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDI-
c ARY, 86th CONG. 2D SESS., STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS AND COPYRIGHTS 99 (Comm. Print 1961) (B. VARMER, STUDY No. 28, COPYRIGHT IN
CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS (1959)) [hereinafter cited as VARMER].
3. Courts have often demonstrated suspicion of the moral worth of dance. In Martinetti
v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C. Cal. 1867) (No. 9, 173), the court refused to protect a series
of ballet tableaux because the court thought the production was "indecent" and "corrupt."
In Dane v. M & H Co., 1316 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963), the court denied
protection of the plaintiff's military striptease dance because, in the court's opinion, the
dance contained nothing calculated to improve the moral or intellectual natures of the
audience.
4. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983)) [hereinafter cited as Copyright Act).
Title 17 was enacted by the Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652, which repealed,
revised, and incorporated sections of the 1909 copyright act as amended, Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. Most of the provisions of the 1976 revision became effective,
supplanting the 1947 act, on January 1, 1978. Sections 118, 304(b) and chapter 8 of the
revised act became effective October 19, 1976.
5. The word "choreography" has several meanings. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
(College Ed. 1966) defines it as (1) dancing, especially ballet dancing; (2) the arrangement or
the written notation of the movements of a dance, especially ballet; (3) the art of devising
dances, especially a ballet. This article uses the word "choreography" primarily to signify
the art of devising dances.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
7. The 1947 copyright act, as its 1909 predecessor, made no provision for the separate
registration of choreographic works. Those few dances actually registered under that act
were relegated to the category of "dramatic or dramatico musical composition." Act of July
30, 1947, ch. 391 § 5(d), 61 Stat. 652, 654 (revised 1976).
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gal recognition as a separate, viable form of art.
The unquestioned assumption of the legal profession has been
that statutory recognition is essential to the preservation of cho-
reographic rights.8 The profession has therefore believed that once
choreographers became aware of the protection extended to their
works under the 1976 Act, they would secure registered proof of
that protection. Led by dancer and choreographer Agnes de Mille, 9
some choreographers have demonstrated their belief in the value of
statutory protection by registering their works under the Copyright
Act. 0
Nevertheless, the vast majority of choreographers, particularly
those less successful financially or those working primarily within.
the confines of their own dance community, have not pursued the
8. See, e.g., Traylor, Choreography, Pantomine and the Copyright Revision Act of
1976, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 227 (1981); Comment, Unraveling the Choreographer's Copy-
right Dilemma, 49 TENN. L. REV. 594 (1982); Comment, Moving to a New Beat: Copyright
Protection for Choreographic Works, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1287 (1977).
9. As early as 1959, de Mille pleaded for "some chance to protect our basic rights."
Letter from Agnes de Mille to United States copyright office (Nov. 10, 1959), reprinted in
VARMER, supra note 2, at 110.
One basic right that de Mille believes has been violated in the past is the choreogra-
pher's right to receive appropriate remuneration for choreographic work. As she explains it,
"Rodgers and Hammerstein got me $50 a week for the twenty-seven-and-a-half minutes of
dance I composed for Oklahoma!, but no royalties. After five years, it was raised to $75 a
week and some more money from the touring company." Osterle, Indomitable Spirit, BAL-
LET NEWS, Sept. 1983, at 11, 16. De Mille has been unable to share in the enormous profits
(estimated to be over $60 million for just the first fifteen years of the musical's existence)
that Oklahoma! has earned. Comment, Moving to a New Beat, supra note 8, at 1287. La-
ments de Mille, "There are fifty shows around the world of Oklahoma! every week, and I
could have been a millionaire." Osterle, supra, at 16.
This problem, however, is not unique to choreographers. The case of Richard Peaslee's
Marat/Sade score illustrates how vulnerable even recognized music composers can be. The
Royal Shakespeare Company commissioned Peaslee to compose the score for its Aldwych
production of Marat/Sade. Peaslee signed the contract "without lengthy study or any ex-
pert counseling." Peaslee later rued his haste. Because the contract contained no billing
clause, Peaslee's name was listed at the bottom of the credits and was even misspelled.
Later, Peaslee found himself unable to negotiate for royalties from the successful Broadway
production of Marat/Sade because his original contract gave him a flat $500 for all "tours."
Peaslee, A Creator's Point of View, 6 PERF. ARTS REV. 448, 449-50 (1975-76). The moral
seems to be that not even a statutory copyright can protect the careless or unwary from
unprofitable deals.
10. De Mille has registered some 18 choreographic works. Letter from Agnes de Mille to
Barbara Singer (Feb. 28, 1983). Antony Tudor and the late George Balanchine have also
registered a substantial number of their works. In addition, the Dance Notation Bureau is
actively working toward the registration of choreographic works.
The Dance Notation Bureau was founded in 1940. It is a not-for-profit corporation
"dedicated to the understanding, documentation and preservation of human movement
through analysis and notation." The Dance Notation Bureau assists choreographers, dance
companies, and dancers in the notation and reconstruction of dances.
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opportunity to register their works under the new Act.1 And even
those choreographers who have registered their works have been
reluctant to enforce their statutory rights in a court of law. 12 Cho-
reographers have not eschewed the statutory mechanism for en-
forcing their rights because they are unaware that an enforcement
mechanism exists. Instead, they have rejected this form of protec-
tion from a belief that the customs of their own community offer
equal, if not superior, protection for choreographic works.
This article will consider whether, for those choreographers
who work primarily within the dance community, the custom of
that community provides a better method for protecting the chore-
ographer's artistic rights than do existing statutory or judicial
schemes. The article will examine the customary protection of cho-
reographic rights and analyze the current Copyright Act. Finally,
this article will look beyond the present interpretation of the stat-
ute to consider the feasibility and effectiveness of legislative or ju-
dicial reform as an alternative to the existing statutory scheme.
The conclusion will be that, at least for the foreseeable future, the
custom of the dance community offers the best form of protection
for the majority of choreographers. 8
. 11. In fiscal year 1980, only 63 of 464,743 total works registered were choreographic
pieces or pantomimes. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS,
1980, at 27 (1981), cited in Comment, Unraveling the Choreographer's Dilemma, supra
note 8, at 595. The majority of the choreographers interviewed for this article had neither
registered nor planned to register their works. The following choreographers were inter-
viewed for this article, either in person, by mail, or by telephone: Thomas
Armour-Founder, Miami Ballet; Gigi Buffington, Manager-Gus Giordano Dance Center;
Merce Cunningham, Artistic Director, and Michael Bloom, Administrator, Cunningham
Dance Foundation; Agnes de Mille, noted Broadway choreographer; Eliot Feld, Artistic Di-
rector, and Cora Cahan, Executive Director, Feld Ballet; Barbara Horgan, Personal Assis-
tant to the late George Balanchine; Paul Mejia, Assistant Artistic Director, Chicago City
Ballet; Ruth Page, Artistic Director, Ruth Page Foundation; Patricia Strauss, Artistic Direc-
tor, L'Image; Muriel Topaz, Executive Director, and Pat Rader, Librarian, Dance Notation
Bureau; Antdny Tudor, Choreographer Emeritus, American Ballet Theatre; Kyle Williams,
Staff, The American Dance Machine; Robert Yesselman, General Manager, Paul Taylor
Dance Company.
12. Indeed, not one case involving a statutory copyright of choreography has yet
reached an American court of law.
13. This article will focus primarily on the dance community itself, where the scope of
choreographic rights is fairly well determined. It must be noted that the question of choreo-
graphic credits becomes much less settled when a choreographer chooses to work outside the
dance community, as, in musical comedy or films. Indeed, experts in the area consider this
question to be so unsettled that the prominent New York copyright law firm of Cowan,
Liebowitz & Latman has, at the request of the Society of Stage Directors and Choreogra-
phers, undertaken a lengthy study of the ownership and use of stage direction and choreog-
raphy. Hummler, Who "Owns" Direction, Choreography, VARIETY, Aug. 3, 1983, at 69, col.
3.
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II. CUSTOMARY PROTECTION OF CHOREOGRAPHIC RIGHTS
Although the popularity of dance is growing in America,14
dance has yet to achieve the prominent position that other per-
forming art forms, such as music and drama, have traditionally en-
joyed with American audiences. The second-class status of dance
has had a detrimental effect on the development of the art of chor-
eography. First, audiences tend to be scarce for most choreogra-
phers and dance companies who work and perform outside of New
York City." Second, even choreographers and dance companies
who do manage to find an audience usually see their potential
profits eaten up by the growing costs of mounting a production. 6
Third, because paying audiences are small, while production costs
are high, most choreographers and dancers are seriously under-
paid.17 As a consequence of these factors, fewer artists are drawn to
dance than to the other arts.
These same factors, however, have also combined to bestow a
benefit on the art of choreography. The relatively few artists will-
ing to commit themselves to the dance and their New York focus s
have promoted the creation of a close-knit, protective community.
The stability of this community has provided dancers and choreog-
raphers with an environment fostering the creation and enforce-
14. Note the recent success of popular dance movies, such as Flashdance and Stayin'
Alive.
15. Although some regional dance companies such as the San Francisco Ballet and
Utah's Ballet West have managed to cultivate a loyal home following, most regional compa-
nies are struggling to attract the local audiences that often mean the difference between
financial failure and success. The San Diego Ballet, for example, was forced to cease opera-
tions some three years ago after amassing some $200,000 worth of debts. BALLET NEWS, Jan.
1984, at 9.
Even major companies however, are not immune from money problems. The American
Ballet Theatre has recently suffered a serious financial setback, due to the nine-week dancer
lockout and the $1.8 million loss that it suffered during the 1982-83 season. BALLET NEws,
Dec. 1983, at 6.
16. The costs of major productions are phenomenal. The American Ballet Theatre's
new production of "Cinderella" carries a price tag of $800,000. BALLET NEWS, Dec. 1983, at
6. Even a "small production, such as ABT principal dancer Martine Van Hamel's 'Amnon
V'Tamar' can cost as much as $75,000." The Miami Herald, Jan. 7, 1984, at D 1-2.
17. See, e.g., T. BENTLEY, WINTER SEASON 33 (1982) where New York City Ballet dancer
Toni Bentley laments the dancer's plight: "We only want enough to pay the rent. Many of
the younger kids simply cannot afford it." Id.
18. Some dance artists, such as choreographer Michael Smuin and dancer Evelyn Cis-
neros of the San Francisco Ballet and choreographer Ben Stevenson and dancer Janie
Parker of the Houston Ballet, have managed to achieve major success and fame on the
regional level. But most regional dancers and choreographers are either preparing them-
selves for an eventual move up to the "big leagues" in New York or are winding down
careers after having made a stab at New York success.
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ment of customs both practical and sensitive to the unique needs
of choreographers.
A. Scope of Choreographic Customs
Choreographers are respected members of the dance commu-
nity. In recognition of their value, community custom provides
rules that credit and protect a choreographer through each stage of
the creation and presentation of his works.
1. CHOREOGRAPHIC CREDIT
For most choreographers, the creative process is a long, 9 ardu-
ous task.20 The choreographer usually begins with an inspiration
derived from an intriguing story, musical composition, or vague
mental image of movement. In the studio, the choreographer uses
his body or the body of selected dancers to translate his inspiration
into movement. For weeks and hours, the choreographer carefully
develops and refines his dance. Eventually, the dance is "set"'" and
ready for performance.
Enduring choreographic credit is the reward that the dance
community awards to the artist who pursues the difficult choreo-
graphic process from inspiration to performance. The choreogra-
pher's name attaches to his work at the first and all subsequent
19. The late George Balanchine has estimated that a "fast choreographer can produce
one minute of stage dance in one hour of rehearsal time." Steinbrink, Footnotes, BALLET
NEWS, Nov. 1981, at 6. Many choreographers, however, cannot keep pace with Balanchine's
estimate.
20. Creation of a Ballet- "The Overgrown Path" is a 1981 ABC Video Enterprises, Inc.
documentary that illustrates this process. The documentary follows Jiri Kylian, artistic di-
rector and choreographer of the Nederlands Dans Theater, as he creates and eventually
presents a new ballet. Kylian first identifies a Leos Janacek composition entitled "On the
Overgrown Path" and a book of photography taken in Janacek's homeland as the sources of
inspiration for the new ballet. Kylian next describes the visual patterns he hopes to achieve
in the ballet. The camera then follows him into what he describes as the most difficult stage
of creating: making his original dreams and thoughts real and visible. As Kylian works in his
studio alone and with his company dancers he explains how he transfers his thoughts to the
bodies of the dancers. Sometimes he has a vision but is forced to alter it because the dancer
cannot perform it exactly as he originally imagined it. Other times the inspiration comes
from the dancer rather than from Kylian himself. Eventually, however, the give and take
between dancer and choreographer forms a dance.
The camera continues to follow Kylian as he rehearses the dance, meets with set and
costume designers, and coordinates the activities that must combine to make a successful
production. The documentary closes with shots of Kylian taking bows at the successful pre-
miere of "The Overgrown Path."
21. A dance is "set" when it is fixed in a recognizable and final form in the minds and
muscles of the dancers with whom it was created. See Traylor, supra note 8, at 234-35.
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performances of the work,22 whether or not the choreographer, his
company, or another company has legal ownership of the piece.2
2. CHOREOGRAPHIC CONTROL
The dance community also recognizes a choreographer's right
to control his works, even after he has "released" them to the
public.
Dance companies customarily consult with a choreographer or
his representative 2  before requesting permission to perform the
22. For example, Marius Petipa's name is still linked to the classic ballet, "Sleeping
Beauty" (first performed in 1890), even though the ballet's choreography has undergone
many changes and revisions through the decades since its first performance.
Enduring choreographic credit may also be offered outside the dance community. The
Playbill for the current revival of On Your Toes, for example, gives credit for "Original
Choreography" to the late George Balanchine. 83 PLAYBILL, May 1983, at 40 (credits).
Balanchine, who created the dances for the original 1936 production of the musical, was
afforded credit for the 1983 production even though illness prevented him from participat-
ing in the revival and even though significant choreographic changes were made by Peter
Martins (who received credit in the Playbill for "Additional Ballet Choreography") as he
restaged the dances. See Mitchell, Reviving On Your Toes, DANCEMAGAZINE, Mar. 1983, at
60, 61.
Note, however, that some complaints have been made about the failure to give original
musical-comedy choreographers credit in later revivals of the shows. Agnes de Mille, Gwen
Verdon, and others maintain that the late Jack Cole should have received choreographic
credit for the 1977 Broadway revival of Man of La Mancha. Cole did work on two dances
for the 1965 Broadway production (for which he received choreographic credit), but Albert
Marre, who directed both the 1965 and 1977 versions, claims that Cole "did not choreograph
or stage dance sequences" for either version. (Marre maintains that the authors, the pro-
ducer, and the director rejected the material that Cole had arranged). De Mille, Verdon, and
others, however, claim that the Man of La Mancha dances bear the unmistakable "Jack
Cole look." The issue has yet to be resolved. Loney, The Legacy of Jack Cole, Part Six,
DANCEMAGAZINE, June 1983, at 62. Perhaps the Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman study, supra
note 13, will help resolve questions such as this one.
23. Some choreographers, such as resident company choreographers, create dances
within the scope of their employment or by special order or commission. In these cases the
works created become "works for hire" and belong to the employer rather than to the chore-
ographers who made them. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp V 1981).
24. The Dance Notation Bureau, for example, acts as a licensing agent between chore-
ographers and companies that wish to have a choreographer's work reconstructed from a
notated score. See Anderson, Preserving Dances in Print, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1979 § 2, at
20, col. 2.
Similarly, those companies who wish to perform works of the late George Balanchine
must now contact certain named beneficiaries under his will. Barbara Horgan, Balanchine's
long-time personal assistant, and Karin Von Aroldingen, a New York City Ballet (NYCB)
principal dancer, share media and foreign rights to most of Balanchine's ballets. Tanaquil
LeClerq, Balanchine's fourth wife and former NYCB principal dancer, has been given the
U.S. rights to most of the ballets. In addition, full rights to certain named ballets have been
given to the dancers who created the lead roles in those ballets. Although NYCB created no
rights, the company is apparently seeking permission from the beneficiaries to retain artistic
control over its own performances of Balanchine ballets. Taub, Footnotes, BALLET NEWS,
19841
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
work.25 Generally, the choreographer or his representative visits
the company to determine the company's capability of performing
the dance. The choreographer evaluates both the technical abilities
and the personalities of the company dancers. A choreographer will
permit the performance of his work only after being convinced that
the skills of the company reflect the artistic worth of the
composition.2
If the choreographer assents to performance of his work, the
parties enter into a formal licensing agreement.2 7 Central to most
licensing contracts is the right of performance. The licensee has
the right to perform a specified work for a certain period of time or
number of performances. The licensee agrees to pay a license fee
for the performance rights and a royalty for each performance
given. 8
The licensing agreement also insures the integrity of the li-
censed work in its performance. In most cases, the choreographer
retains artistic control. The contract will provide that the chore-
ographer or his agent2 teach the dance and supervise a specified
Aug. 1983, at 8. It must be noted that, although many of Balanchine's ballets have been
registered with the Copyright Office, it is not clear that all of the bequeathed ballets are
registered. The courts have yet to hear a case concerning a bequest of either a registered or
a non-registered ballet.
25. Ronn Guidi recently described this process in Loring Remembered, BALLET NEwS,
Dec. 1982, at 36. The author related how he, as founder of the Oakland Ballet, approached
the late Eugene Loring for permission to perform two of his ballets, "Billy the Kid" and
"Sisters." In response to Guidi's invitation, Loring first visited the Oakland Ballet in 1976 to
assess its ability to. perform "Billy the Kid." Loring granted permission after watching the
company take class. He then taught the ballet to the company and guided them through
first rehearsal and then performance. After the successful performance of "Billy the Kid,"
Guidi approached Loring for permission to perform "Sisters." "Finally," Guidi recalls, "I
asked him if we had the people to do it. One could see his mind reviewing the personalities
of the dancers in the company. Finally, a 'Yes' came. . . ." Id.
26. If a choreographer denies permission he may suggest an alternate work that he be-
lieves the company is better able to perform.
27. These contracts are generally of short duration. Dance Notation Bureau licensing
agreements normally last for one to two years. The Bureau has granted, however, licenses
for up to five years when the licensee company has incurred exceptional expenses because a
full score did not exist. Letter from Muriel Topaz, Executive Director, Dance Notation Bu-
reau, to Barbara Singer (Nov. 1, 1982).
The choreographers interviewed for this article, see supra note 11, indicated that their
licensing customs make no distinction between dances that are protected by statutory copy-
right registration and those that are not.
28. The right of performance is normally the only economic right included in these
contracts. The licensee may receive a limited right to make copies, but this is usually re-
stricted to rehearsal and reconstruction purposes only. Derivative rights are generally not
included, nor does the contract cover the licensing of musical scores.
29. Often the choreographer, sends a member of his own company who is familiar with
the dance in question.
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number of rehearsals, 0 including final stylistic rehearsals.8 The
contract may also provide for the choreographer's participation in
the staging of the dance.
In many licenses the choreographer's artistic control does not
end with the first performance of his dance."2 Stipulations may
permit periodic review by the choreographer. The contract may
also prohibit any choreographic or staging alterations in the work
absent consultation with the choreographer. The choreogrhpher
may also reserve the right to withdraw the work if he believes that
the company is no longer capable of performing his dance." Thus,
the licensing customs of the dance community accommodate both
the licensee company and the licensor choreographer. The com-
pany receives the right to perform a desired work; the choreogra-
pher receives the assurance of monetary remuneration and the re-
tention of two cherished rights: the credit for his choreographic
work and maintainance of continued artistic control.
B. Enforcement of Choreographic Customs
Both choreographers and potential licensees view choreo-
graphic licensing agreements as a fair and efficient method of de-
termining their rights and responsibilities. Breaches of these con-
tracts are therefore rare. 4
Occasional breaches are nevertheless inevitable. Potential
licensees, particularly those outside the dance world, may not feel
constrained to honor the dance customs of affording creative credit
30. The choreographer usually receives a designated fee for all such services rendered.
The choreographer's transportation and a per diem for time spent on location are also cov-
ered by the licensee.
31. The choreographer may be assisted by the licensee company's Regisseur, who,
among other things arranges, coordinates, and supervises rehearsals.
32. The crucial role continued creative control plays in the choreographic process is
demonstratedd by the negotiations that surrounded the birth of the Public Broadcasting
System (PBS) "Dance in America" series. Dance experts, including Robert Joffrey, and Ed-
ward Villella, were called to the first meeting. These experts were unanimous in their belief
that the series should not get off the ground "unless the choreographer [could] be part of
the entire process right through the editing." The PBS representative opposed the giving of
creative control to the choreographers, but the major funders involved in the program
threatened to withdraw unless the choreographers were in control. PBS eventually bowed to
the financial pressure and recognized the choreographer's right to artistic control in all
"Dance in America" programs. Cable Production: What Every Arts Organization Needs to
Know (R.K. Manoff ed. 1982) (quoting C. Aaron, Senior Vice President for programming at
PBS, 1976-1981).
33. See infra note 107, for examples of withdrawals that have actually occurred.
34. There are apparently no recorded cases of actions for breach of a choreographic
licensing agreement.
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to the choreographer 5 and seeking permission to perform works
already presented to the public. Furthermore, the choreographer
may not always occupy an equal bargaining position with the po-
tential licensee. Contracts resulting from negotiations conducted
under these conditions may deprive the choreographer of adequate
protection. And even those contracts granting the choreographer
his royalty and artistic control rights may still be violated by an
uncooperative licensee.
Few choreographers consider seeking a legal remedy for breach
of a licensing contract. There are several reasons for their rejection
of legal sanctions. First, some choreographers view unlicensed per-
formances as a risk of the trade of choreography or free publicity.
Second, most choreographers prefer to rely on negotiation or peer
pressure in settling their differences with breaching licensees.86
Third, even choreographers who initially consider the pursuance of
legal action are discouraged by the costs involved in bringing suit:
litigation is an expensive, lengthy process that may strain the
budget and patience of struggling choreographers.3 7 Furthermore,
the small amounts of lost profit resulting from the breach of most
choreographic licenses fail to justify legal effort.38 Finally, unless
the choreographer initially possessed sufficient bargaining power to
insure contract provisions that favored him, legal enforcement of
the contract may not offer him much relief.
Choreographers thus have a licensing custom strong enough to
protect them from most unauthorized use of their choreographic
works. Community sanction or the philosophy of the risk of the
trade resolves most of those violations that do occur. For the ma-
jority of choreographers, then, there is no need for resort outside
the dance community for protection of choreographic works.
35. See supra note 22, the discussion of Jack Cole and the Man of La Mancha
choreography.
36. Many choreographers maintain that the threat of ostracism from the dance commu-
nity is sufficient to deter most potential breaches. See supra note 8.
37. Choreographers and dancers have a reputation for being uncomfortable with busi-
ness and financial transactions. In her journal, Winter Season, New York Ballet dancer
Toni Bentley remarks, "[W]e are all grossly ignorant of money matters, our rights, and even
what we can and should demand. . . ." T. BENTLEY, WINTER SEASON 33 (1982). This atti-
tude is clearly changing: witness the recent successful nine-week strike by the dancers of the
American Ballet Theatre.
38. See Bennetts, Pirating of the "The Pirates of Penzance", N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,
1982; Wilford Leach, director of the New York Shakespeare Festival production of "Pi-
rates," commenting on the high cost of copyright litigation, noted that "[t]he copyright law
merely gives you the right to sue. But lawsuits are enormously expensive. You can't necessa-
rily afford to recover the money; it would cost more to get it than you would get."
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III. RECOGNITION OF CHOREOGRAPHIC RIGHTS UNDER THE 1976
COPYRIGHT ACT
Although most of the choreographic community has been sat-
isfied with relying on licensing customs, the legal community be-
lieves that choreographers can gain full protection of their works
only by registering them under the provisions of the Copyright
Act. Although the Act does provide some benefits to choreogra-
phers,39 certain aspects of the Act may discourage even successful
choreographers from profiting from the Act's protection. And even
choreographers deciding to register their works may discover that
the rights enforceable as a result of registration 0 exclude those
rights most valuable to the choreographer.
A. Qualifying Choreographic Works for Statutory Registration
The Copyright Act establishes prerequisites for registration of
a choreographic work with the Copyright Office. The nature of the
Act's requirements and the effort necessary for their fulfillment
tend, however, to discourage many choreographers from registering
their works.
1. STATUS AS A "CHOREOGRAPHIC" WORK
The 1976 Act provides for registration of a creative endeavor if
it qualifies as a "choreographic work. ' 1 Although the Act does not
define the phrase "choreographic work, 4 2 the legislative history
and case law underlying the Act suggest a definition far narrower
than that customarily followed by the choreographic community.
Among members of that community, choreography is loosely de-
fined as anything a choreographer presents to the public. 48 Legisla-
tive history indicates that the drafters of the new Act ascribed a
stricter definition to the word. The drafters meant to exclude "so-
39. See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
40. Copyright registration is permissive under the new Act. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a). Al-
though copyrights automatically subsist in all works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), no action for infringement of such rights may be
maintained unless the work is registered with the Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4).
42. The drafters thought it unnecessary to define "choreographic works" because they
believed the phrase had "a fairly settled meaning." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS 5659, 5666-67.
43. The choreographers interviewed for this article initially offered a variety of defini-
tions, from "movement" to "making dances." When pressed, however, none was willing to
settle for a definition that would in any way restrict a choreographer's prerogative to create
however and whatever he chooses.
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cial dance steps" and "simple routines" as too common or basic to
merit copyright protection." The Act thus attempts to set an arbi-
trary minimum level of difficulty, which can act to deny registra-
tion to very simple or highly innovative dances.4
Under the old Act, choreographers had to register their works
under the rubric of "dramatic composition.""" To qualify for regis-
tration a dance had to depict some story or emotion. 7 The dance
community, however, has always refused to classify choreography
as a mere species of drama. Instead, choreographers view their
work as a separate and distinct art form, which embodies "an ar-
rangement in time-space, using human bodies as its units of de-
sign. 114  Thus, although a choreographer has the freedom of por-
traying a story through the movements he creates, 4  he may
44. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 42, at 54, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5567; see also VARMER, supra note 2, at 100 (copyright presupposes an original
intellectual creation of authorship).
45. Agnes de Mille, warned against setting such a minimum standard, claiming that
"[i]t is not the province of the law to judge whether a dance, even the most trite and com-
mercial, has creative original value." VARMER, supra note 2, at 110 (letter from Agnes
George de Mille).
46. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5(d), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076; Act of July 30, 1947, ch.
391, § 5(d), 61 Stat. 652, 654. Section 5(d) provided for the registration of "dramatic or
dramatico-musical compositions." Section 202.7 of the Regulations enacted under the old
Act allowed "choreographic works of a dramatic character" to be registered under § 5(d).
Taubman, Choreography Under Copyright Revision: The Square Peg in the Round Hole
Unpegged, 10 PERF. ARTS REV. 219, 220 (1980).
47. Courts recognized as early as 1868 that a story could be portrayed by movement as
well as by words. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1135-36 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552).
But movement that did not tell a story or depict emotions could not qualify as a dramatic
composition. Fuller v. Bemis, 50 F. 926, 929 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892). Early regulations issued
by the Register of Copyrights echoed the law's hesitant approach to choreography. Mirel,
Legal Protection for Choreography, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 792, 803 (1952). In 1948, however,
the Register officially sanctioned the registration of choreographic works that fit the defini-
tion of "dramatic composition." As a result of this action, Hanya Holm was able to register
her Kiss Me, Kate choreography in 1952. Martin, The Dance: Copyright, N.Y. Times, Mar.
30, 1952, § 2 Pt. I, at 10x, col. 6; Beckley, Choreography Is Copyrighted For First Time,
N.Y. Herald Tribune, Mar. 14, 1952; Mirell, supra, at 810. Other choreographers began to
follow suit. In 1953 Ruth Page successfully registered the text of her "Beethoven Sonata" as
a "published book." Choreographer Gets Copyright Under New Act, N.Y. Herald Tribune,
Jan. 7, 1953. And George Balanchine resubmitted and successfully registered his "Sym-
phony in C," which had been submitted and rejected prior to the registration of Holm's
dances. See Arcomano, A Dancer's Business: Choreography and Copyright (pt. 1),
DANCEMAGAZINE, Apr. 1980, at 58-59. The success of these registrations ultimately paved the
way for the statutory reform of 1976.
48. VARMER, supra note 2, at 110 (letter from Agnes de Mille).
49. A recent example of a "story" ballet is Peter Martins' "Magic Flute." Martins be-
gan with a basic story and scenario instructions (e.g., "Luke plays the flute"), which had
been written on the piano score used in the original Ivanov version of "The Magic Flute."
Martins then filled in the details of the storyline and devised choreography to convey the
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express his art through means other than movement.50
The drafters of the 1976 Act included a separate category for
choreographic works in order to eliminate the storytelling require-
ment. Case law treatment of choreographic works, however, exhib-
its a constitutionally based bias that is more difficult to dismiss.
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution restricts copyright protec-
tion to works of authorship that promote the "useful" arts."
Courts have interpreted this restriction as an invitation to judge
the moral worth of choreographic works.5 2 But just as choreogra-
phers shrink from the notion of any application of arbitrary stan-
dards of difficulty to their works, they also abhor any legal judg-
ment of the morality of their works.
In light of the biases reflected in legislative history and case
law, it is not difficult to see why choreographers, particularly those
operating outside of the mainstream of traditional dance, are reluc-
tant to register their works under the statutes: to do so would be to
offer tacit approval to the statutory and case law definitions of
choreography that they, as choreographers, find so offensive.
story and emotions of this fairy tale. Martins & Cornfeld, Working Magic, BALLET NEWS,
Jan. 1982, at 23.
50. Merce Cunningham, for example, maintains that his choreography does not begin
"with an idea that concerns character or story, a fait accompli around which the actions are
grouped for reference purposes." Instead, he starts "with the movement," which may even
involve something rather than someone moving. Cunningham, Two Questions and Five
Dances, in DANCE As A THEATRE ART 198, 199 (S. Cohen ed. 1975). And modern choreogra-
pher Paul Taylor once went so far as to create a dance, "Epic," that did not involve any
movement at all. (He simply stood motionless in a business suit on stage while the audience
listened to a recording of telephone time signals).
51. "The Congress shall have power. . . to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective
writings. . . ." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
52. In the 1867 case of Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C. Cal. 1867) (No.
9,173), the court refused to recognize copyrights in a production that consisted of scant
dialogue "tacked on to a succession of ballet and tableaux." Id. at 922. In the court's judg-
ment this "exhibition of women 'lying about loose' or otherwise" was indecent, corrupt, and
in no way promoted the useful arts. Id. The court in Fuller v. Bemis, 50 F. 926, 929
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889) was likewise wary of the seductive effect created by modern dance pio-
neer Loie Fuller as she swirled her skirts in her "Serpentine Dance."
This early concern for the immoral nature of dance cannot be dismissed as mere Victo-
rian prudery. As late as 1963 a court rejected protection of a choreographic work on these
grounds. Dane v. M & H Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). The plaintiff in
this case had created a military/striptease dance number, which she had used to audition for
a role in the stage version of "Gypsy." The court refused to recognize the plaintiff's com-
mon-law copyright claim on the grounds that where "a performance contains nothing of a
literary, dramatic or musical character which is calculated to elevate, cultivate, inform, or
improve the moral or intellectual natures of the audience, it does not tend to promote the
progress of science of the useful arts." Id. at 429.
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2. STATUS AS AN "ORIGINAL" WORK
Those dances that come within the statutory definition of
"choreographic work" must also be "original" in order to qualify
for statutory copyright protection. Although "original" can mean
"novel" or "unusual,"53 in the context of copyright law the term
signifies that a work has had its origin in the skill, labor, or judg-
ment of its creator." The courts have not yet considered the level
of originality required for choreographic works. Nevertheless, cases
involving musical compositions provide some guidance. In analyz-
ing the originality of music, courts look to the manner in which
rhythm, harmony, and melody are combined.55 These are the "fin-
gerprints" of the composition; they establish its identity." If the
composer injects something new and recognizably his own into the
combination of notes that he presents to the public, the resulting
piece will be copyrightable, 7 even if the composition uses familiar
rhythm or harmony patterns.5 8
Similarly, in judging originality of a choreographic work, the
court should consider the choreographer's treatment of rhythm,
space, and movement in the work. As long as the dance bears the
choreographer's individual stamp, e it is irrelevant that his dance
53. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951). The
Alfred court upheld the validity of a copyright in certain mezzotints based on works in the
public domain because the tints were "versions" that "'originated' with those who made
them." Id. at 104.
54. Id. In Puddo v. Buonamici Statutary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971), the
court dismissed a claim of copyright infringement because the plaintiff's statuettes did not
bear proper copyright notice. The court did, however, declare that the statuettes were copy-
rightable because they had been made "from scratch" and evidenced a "modicum of origi-
nality." Id. at 402, 403.
55. Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). The plaintiff's song, "Tonight He Sailed Again" was found to be "similar" to the
defendant's song, "I Love You, Yes I Do." The court nevertheless declared the plaintiff's
song to be copyrightable because "when played [the plaintiff's song] leaves an impression of
newness or novelty ... " Id. at 400.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 877 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910). The plaintiff complained
that the chorus of the defendant's song, "I Think I Hear a Woodpecker Knocking at My
Family Tree," closely. imitated the chorus of the plaintiff's song, "The Arab Love Song."
Judge Learned Hand agreed that an infringement had occurred because, out of a total of 17
bars, the first 13 of each song were substantially the same. Judge Hand noted, however, that
"the right of the author of a musical composition is not affected by the fact that he has
borrowed in general from style of his predecessors." Id. at 877.
59. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograhing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes considered the copyrightability of certain chromolithographies that had
been prepared for circus advertisements. Although the plaintiff's works were of "limited
pretensions," Justice Holmes believed them to be copyrightable because they emanated
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uses well-known or often-used steps. Choreographers are legiti-
mately concerned, however, that the courts lack the expertise to
make such artistic decisions. By declining to pursue the judicial
enforcement of their rights, choreographers have effectively pre-
vented the courts from even having the opportunity to make such
a decision.
3. STATUS AS A "FIXED" WORK
The Copyright Act requires that works of authorship be fixed
in some tangible medium before they can be entitled to statutory
copyright protection. 0 Because dance is, in essence, an intangible
work of art that lives primarily through performance instead of
through recordation, 1 the fixation requirement creates a formida-
ble obstacle to the registration of choreographic works.
Two methods are currently available s for the fixation of
dance: notation 3  and audiovisual preservation.6 4  Yet chore-
ographers find neither one of these methods entirely satisfactory.
Because notation is a difficult and little known language, it re-
quires the services of a specially trained expert 5 and is therefore
from the unique "personal reaction of an individual upon nature." Id. at 250.
60. "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later -developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
61. The late George Balanchine viewed his ballets as "butterflies" destined to live for a
season. In answer to a question concerning the preservation of his ballets, Balanchine once
remarked, "They don't have to be preserved. Why should they be? I think ballet is NOW.
It's about people who are NOW. Not about what will be. Because as soon as you don't have
these bodies to work with, it's already finished." Balanchine, Work In Progress, in DANCE As
A THEATRE ART 187, 192 (S. Cohen ed. 1975).
62. Scientists are now experimenting with a third alternative: programming computers
to create visual displays of dance. At least one such computerized program will soon be
available to the public. Eddie Dombrower, a video games designer for Mattel Electronics,
has produced a Dance on Microcomputers program, which allows the viewer to see an
animated dancer from all angles at regular speed, in slow motion, and by freeze frame. Com-
puter Choreographs Dance Steps, PERSONAL COMPUTING, June 1983, at 215. See generally
Minosky, Video Graphics & Grand Jets, SCIENCE 82, May 1982, at 25.
63. The two major types of notation systems are Labanotation and Benesh Notation.
Although they differ greatly in appearance, both work with a basic staff noted with symbols
that designate with extreme accuracy not only body positions and movements but also time
and space allocations. See R. BENESH & J. BENESH, AN INTRODUCTION TO BENESH DANCE
NOTATION (1955). The Dance Notation Bureau is able to record some twenty-five dances per
year and currently boasts a library of over three hundred Labanotated scores. Of these three
hundred scores, forty-one are registered with the Copyright Office. Information supplied by
Pat Rader, Dance Notation Bureau Librarian.
64. Choreography can be preserved on either film or tape.
65. The Dance Notation Bureau offers an extensive training program in Labanotation
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quite expensive.6e Furthermore, although notation can reflect the
most subtle nuances of movement,6" it does not capture style or
individual interpretation." Finally, because the notation method is
not readily visual, it is not always a convenient rehearsal or recon-
struction tool. As a result, many choreographers forego fixation of
their works in notated form.
Visual preservation, though less expensive than notation, may
likewise be beyond the budget of a struggling choreographer." Al-
that reaches an estimated two hundred students per year. In addition, approximately
ninety-five schools nationwide offer courses in notation. However, the percentage of dancers
skilled in notation remains low.
66. It has been estimated that the cost of initial notation will range from $1200 to
$2400 for an "average" ballet, while the cost of reconstructing a dance from notation ranges
from $1000 to $1200. Comment, Unraveling the Choreographer's Copyright Dilemma, 49
TENN. L. REv. 594, 605-06 n.52 (1982). The cost varies according to the length of the dance
and the novelty of the steps involved. For example, a classical ballet that employs standard
combinations is easier and therefore less expensive to notate than is a modern work that
uses experimental movements. Kibbee, Copyright Protection for Choreography, ARTS &
THE LAW, Jan. 1976, at 1, 4. Occasionally the high cost of notation is defrayed by grants or
donations. Recently, for example, the Dance Notation Bureau received a $40,640 grant from
the National Endowment for the Humanities to notate six Antony Tudor ballets. Footnotes,
BALLET NEWS, April 1982, at 10.
67. Hutchinson, Preservation of the Dance Score Through Notation, in THE DANCE
HAS MANY FACES 151, 161 (W. Sorell ed. 1966); see also Balanchine, Preface to A. HUTCHIN-
SON, LABANOTATION at xi-xii (1970) [hereinafter cited as Preface]. Indeed, Labanotation can
record choreography so precisely that a ballet, such as Balanchine's "Symphonie Con-
certante" (originally performed in 1945) can be reconstructed accurately by someone who
has never even seen the ballet performed. When American Ballet Theatre (ABT) artistic
director Mikhail Baryshnikov decided to revive "Symphonie Concertante," which had not
been performed since November 1952, he discovered that neither Balanchine nor any of his
assistants remembered the ballet well enough to restage it. Aside from a few still photo-
graphs and some "vague verbal descriptions," all that remained of the ballet was a Laba-
notation score. Baryshnikov nevertheless asked for and received Balanchine's permission to
perform the ballet. Balanchine sent Labanotator Gretchen Schumacher (a former ABT
dancer) to ABT to help in the reconstruction process. Schumacher had never seen
"Symphonie Concertante," but by studying the written score intensively (she likened the
process to the way a conductor studies a musical score) she succeeded in accurately recon-
structing the individual steps and then demonstrating them to the company dancers. Since
its premier in early 1983, both critics and the public have warmly received the revival. See
Kriegsman, ABT's Return & the Rebirth of a Ballet, The Wash. Post., Jan. 16, 1983, at G1,
2, col. 2; Reiter, Restored to Life, BALLET NEWS, June 1983, at 19.
68. Hutchinson, supra note 67, at 161.
69. Most choreographers who elect to fix their works in audiovisual form choose tape.
Although the tape is not as expensive as notation, the costs still mount up. The choreogra-
pher may purchase his own equipment, which will cost him a minimum of $1200 per set.
Tapes cost approximately $15 a piece. Alternatively the choreographer can hire a profes-
sional. Initial taping costs will run from $70-100 per hour, and additional charges of $70-100
per hour may be levied if editing is required. These estimates were supplied by Mr. John
Freeman of ViGard, Inc., Miami, Florida.
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though film captures style,70 its range is limited. First, it offers
only moving images, which are not very useful to the choreogra-
pher or reconstructor wishing to observe isolated movements. 1
Second, film cannot convey the three dimensional nature of
dance.72 Finally, unless the film is shot from the back instead of
from the audience's point of view, the film provides a mirror image
of the dance, reversing left and rights.7  Thus, many choreogra-
phers, particularly those who have not achieved financial success,
pass up visual fixation as an unnecessary luxury.
Even those choreographers who have both the desire and the
resources to fix their works may find it a mixed blessing. Under the
1976 Act, statutory protection does not attach unless and until a
work is fixed. 4 Unfixed works are expressly left to common law
copyright protection." So long as the work remains unfixed and
unpublished, this protection is of perpetual duration.7' Statutory
protection, on the other hand, lasts for a maximum of life of the
choreographer plus fifty years.77 Upon the termination of statutory
70. Indeed, some believe that film captures little else. See, e.g., Martin, Dance on Film,
in THE DANCE HAS MANY FACES 164, 167 (W. Sorell ed. 1966).
71. See Preface, supra note 67. That film augmented by notes may not even be an
accurate reconstruction tool in some circumstances is demonstrated by the recent ABT revi-
val of Balanchine's "Bourree Fantasque." After "Bourree" left the New York City Ballet
repertoire in the 1950s, all that remained of the ballet was a film of the ballet that lacked a
musical sound track and "basic choroeology" (the Dance Notation Bureau does list "Bour-
ree" in its catalogue of Labanotated dances, but it is not clear whether this score was used
in the ABT reconstruction). The dance was reconstructed from these sources and was
presented to Balanchine, who refined and then approved the reconstruction. After the ballet
opened, however, a photograph was discovered that indicated a larger cast had been used in
the original. ABT then added two dancers to the second movement and four to the third to
restore the original patterns. The Ballet That Almost Wasn't, ON PoiNT, Summer 1982, at
2, 12.
72. Hutchinson, supra note 67, at 160. Peter Martins recently described this problem as
it related to television productions. According to Martins, "What it boils down to, is that
there is no space in television... . [W]hen you make a dance for the stage, you work with a
straight line, a circle, a semicircle, a diagonal. There are the options. On television, these
options become totally distorted." Gruen, Dancevision, DANCEMAGAZINE, Sept. 1983, at 100,
100.
73. Hutchinson, supra note 67, at 160.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1).
76. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). This section applies to works created on or after January 1,
1978. Works created but not published or copyrighted prior to January 1, 1978 are also
granted protection for life plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 303. Works that were copyrighted
prior to January 1, 1978, and that were still in their first term on that date are entitled to
the full first term of twenty-eight years plus an elective renewed term of forty-seven years.
17 U.S.C. § 304(a). Works that were copyrighted prior to January 1, 1978, and that were in
their renewal term on that date are entitled to protection for a term of seventy-five years
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protection, the work falls into the public domain.78 The choreogra-
pher who fixes his works, therefore, effectively deprives his future
heirs of unlimited control and use of his dances. 9
B. Economic Nature of Rights Secured Under the Copyright
Act
Because the 1976 Act requires that dance satisfy statutory and
judicial notions of choreography, originality, and fixation before
they can be registered, some choreographers have rejected the
registration process. Others, however, have decided to bear the
risks of obtaining statutory registration. Those who do register
their works may then enforce their statutory rights in a court of
law. 0 However, they may be disappointed in the range and nature
of rights that accompany judicial enforcement of registration. For
the primary interest of choreographers in maintaining the artistic
integrity of their works conflicts with the Copyright Act's favoring
of economic benefits at the expense of artistic concerns.
According to the Supreme Court, the basis of the copyright
clause of the Constitution is "the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talent of authors. . . ."I" Guided by that phi-
losophy, the drafters of the 1976 revision chose to limit copyright
* protection to certain economic rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work...
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic ...
(4) ... to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) . . .to display the copyrighted work publicly. 2
from the date the copyright was originally secured. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b).
78. That is, it is no longer subject to any one person's ownership or control. Once a
work has become part of the public domain, anyone is free to use the work. See, e.g., Don-
aldson v. Becket, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
79. The works of the late Mikhail Fokine provide a good illustration of this point.
Working primarily with archival tapes, the Fokine family has registered many of his works.
Because Fokine died in 1942, statutory protection will expire in 1992. As a result, these
works will soon fall into the public domain. Had the dances never been fixed, the Fokine
family arguably could have controlled the use of these pieces well into the 21st century and
beyond.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
81. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. V 1981).
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Of these economic rights, only performance and derivation
have current value to the average choreographer. Although the
other copyrights may prove valuable at some future time, at
present they are only of minor concern to most choreographers.
1. PERFORMANCE AND DERIVATIVE RIGHTS
A dance lives primarily through a dancer's interpretation. The
choreographer, therefore, will be vitally concerned with the circum-
stances surrounding each performance of his work. The Copyright
Act guarantees to each choreographer who registers his work the
exclusive right to control all public presentations of that work,
whether direct or indirect (e.g., through television broadcast),"3
and whether or not for profit.
The Act also guarantees the registering choreographer the ex-
clusive right to control derivations based on his work.8 4 A deriva-
tion includes any recasting, transformation, or adaption of the
original work.85 Any revival or restaging of a work that includes
significant changes made to accommodate modern dancers or mod-
ern styles constitutes a derivative work instead of a simple per-
formance. In light of the current popularity of mounting new and
innovative productions of old and classical dances,' the value of
derivative rights to all choreographers, both those who create the
original works and those who wish to restage them, is obvious.
When violation of either of these two rights occurs, the Act
gives the copyright owner the choice of injunctive relief or money
damages.87 The choreographer who is able to act before the unli-
censed performance of his work therefore has the power to prevent
such a performance. Otherwise, his remedy is limited to damages
measured by lost profits8s (along with possible injunctive relief to
prevent further violations). Unfortunately, a recovery based on lost
profits may provide little comfort to the average choreographer,
who makes little profit on the performance of his work.
83. Subsection (4) of 17 U.S.C. § 106 provides for control over public performance,
whereas subsection (5) relates to public display. As to choreographic works, the difference
would be between live and recorded presentations.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
86. Recent examples include Erik Bruhn's restaging of "La Sylphide" for the American
Ballet Theatre and Rudolf Nureyev's revival of "Don Quixote."
87. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504 (Supp. V 1981).
88. Id. § 504(b). The choreographer may elect to receive statutory damages, which may
be for not less than $250 and not more than $10,000. The amount of such damages awarded
lies within the court's discretion. Id. § 504(c)..
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2. PREPARATION, SALE, AND DISPLAY OF COPIES
Whenever a choreographer fixes his work, a copy results. The
Act ensures that the preparation and distribution of any such cop-
ies will be controlled by the owner of the copyright in the fixed
work. 9 Because the dance market currently focuses on live presen-
tation, the value of these remaining rights to most modern chore-
ographers is limited. Nevertheless, several of the more innovative
and successful choreographers, such as Merce Cunningham and
Twyla Tharp, have begun to experiment by creating dances specifi-
cally designed for audiovisual display. In addition, the home
video recorder business is creating a new and potentially lucrative
market for dance films and tapes.9
The Copyright Act thus secures economic rights that may
prove valuable to choreographers, or at least to the successful few.
The popular choreographer can license the right to perform or
stage a derivative version of his work and earn a small profit. He
can also sell these rights and earn a greater profit, but the conse-
quence is the loss of further control over those aspects of his work.
The securing of these rights, however, fails to entice most
choreographers to register their works under the Act. First, the
custom of the dance community already guarantees choreographers
the same economic rights. Second, these economic rights are not of
paramount importance to most choreographers. Because the aver-
age choreographer will never reap financial gain from his creative
endeavors, his creative impetus must stem from other factors: the
desire to express or communicate.2 And because his primary moti-
89. Id. § 106(2), (3).
90. Cunningham has collaborated with Charles Atlas to produce several films and video
tapes that can be rented or purchased. Kostelenetz, Cunningham Revisited, DANCEMA-
GAZINE, July 1982, at 57, 59. Tharp has produced several made-for-television ballets. Her
latest endeavor, "The Catherine Wheel," includes computerized animation, optical effects,
and other editing tricks. See Siegel, The World According to Tharp, DIAL MAG., Mar. 1983,
at 44; Vaughan, TV, BALLET NEWS, June 1983, at 43. Note also that Transmedia Communi-
cations Network, the Metropolitan Opera Guild, and Ballet News are collaborating with
notables of the ballet world to produce a "Video Dictionary of Ballet," which will contain
150 entries and will soon be available on videodisc. Footnotes, BALLET NEWS, Aug. 1983, at
6,6.
91. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). In
Sony, the Supreme Court held that home videotaping of broadcast copyrighted works does
not constitute copyright infringement.
92. That money is not always the motivating factor for the choreographer is evident
from remarks made by Eliot Feld as he recently described the American Ballet Theatre.
According to Feld, "[tihey wanted to buy things, to make a clear exchange, so I would have
the money, and they would have the ballet. I always found that objectionable." Reiter, His
Own Man, BALLET NEWS, June 1982, at 11, 13.
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vation is not money but instead the need to make an artistic state-
ment,9" his primary concern is not with the economic rights se-
cured by the statute. Instead, it is the artistic or "moral" rights
omitted from the Act's aegis-but included in the rights recog-
nized by the custom of the dance community that is a choreogra-
pher's primary concern.
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE
CHOREOGRAPHER'S ARTISTIC RIGHTS
The 1976 Copyright Act is the primary mechanism currently
available for protecting creative works. Yet, because the Act pro-
tects only economic rights, it denies American choreographers legal
recognition of their artistic rights. This lack of legal recognition is
not always a serious problem for choreographers. Lawmakers and
lawyers, however, continue to believe that legal recognition is es-
sential to the preservation of choreographic rights. Such recogni-
tion could be achieved in two ways: first, the Copyright Act should
incorporate the European notion of moral rights, and second, the
recognition and the enforcement of artistic rights could be dele-
gated to the courts. Both of these alternatives have some merit.
Nevertheless, as the following discussion demonstrates, both pos-
sess flaws serious enough to suggest that legal recognition of the
choreographer's artistic rights is neither likely in the near future
nor absolutely essential to the preservation of choreographers'
rights.
A. Legislative Recognition of Moral Rights
Although Congress has chosen to rely solely on economic in-
centives for the stimulation of creative endeavors, legislatures of
other nations have recognized, in addition to economic rights, the
creative, moral rights, which are equally, if not more, important to
an artist's career.
Parties to the Berne Copyright Convention 94 acknowledge
that, as well as financial reward,9 5 creators desire and deserve the
93. See, e.g., T. BENTLEY, WINTER SEASON 33 (1982) ("We dancers are dedicated to the
art, not the money.")
94. Berne Convention of the International Union for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 3 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND
TREATIES OF THE WORLD (BNA) (1972 Supp.). At present some 53 nations are parties to the
Convention. Id. The United States, however, is not a party.
95. The Convention recognizes the following economic rights: Cinematographic repro-
duction (Art. 14), derivation (Arts. 12 and 14), distribution (Arts. 11 and 14), performance
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fame and acclaim gained through public recognition of the artistic
merit of their creative endeavors. The Convention secures to au-
thors, including choreographers, 9 a set of personal, artistic rights
that exist independently of any transfer of the copyrighted work or
the economic rights derived therefrom. 7
Parties to the Convention have incorporated this recognition
of moral rights in domestic copyright legislation. These rights di-
vide into two categories: "paternity" rights and "integrity" rights.
Paternity rights include,
(1) the right to be known publicly as the author of a work,9"
(2) the right to prevent someone else from claiming authorship
of that work, ' 9 and
(Arts. 11 and 11 ter), and display of cinematographic reproductions (Art. 14).
96. Article 2(1) of the Convention expressly extends these rights to choreographic
works.
97. The Convention provides that:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph
shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic
rights, and shall be exercised by the persons or institutions authorized by the
legislation of the country where protection is claimed ....
Convention, supra note 94, art. 6bis.
For further discussion of the scope of these rights as applied to artists, see Roeder, The
Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L.
REv. 554 (1940); Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506 (1955);
Comment, An Artist's Personal Rights in His Creative Works: Beyond the Human Can-
nonball and the Flying Circus, 9 PAC. L.J. 855 (1978).
98. For an example of recognition of this right, see Copyright Act R.S., CAN. REv. STAT.
ch 55, § 12(7) (1970); Propriete litteraire et artistique, CODE CIVIL art. 543 (6) (Petits Codes
Dalloz 1979) (France); CODICE CIvn.E art. 2575-2583 (1976) (Italy). See also Brazil, Coles~o,
art. 667 (1958), and Law on the Rights of Authors and Other Provisions, art. 25(i) (1973);
Chile, Law No. 17.336 on Copyright, art. 14(1) (1972); Denmark, Law No. 158 of 1961 on
Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works § 3 (1977); Egypt, Law relating to the Protection
of Copyright, art. 1 (1975); France, Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Property, art. 6
(1957); German Democratic Republic, Copyright Act § 14(1) (1965); Italy, Law No. 633 of
Apr. 22, 1941, for the Protection of Copyright and Other Rights, art. 20 (1979); Japan, Law
No. 48 of 1970, art. 19(1) (1978); Lebanon, Decree Providing Regulation of Commercial and
Industrial Property Rights in Syria and Lebanon, art. 146 (1946); Mexico, Federal Law of
Copyright, art. 2(I) (1963); Norway, Act Relating to Property Rights in Literary, Scientific
or Artistic Works § 3 (1977); U.S.S.R., Fundamentals of Civil Legislation, ch. 4, art. 98
(1976); Venezuela, Law Relating to Copyright, art. 20 (1962). All of the above provisions are
printed in 1, 2, & 3 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1982). See
also Israel, Copyright Ordinance (Amend. No. 4) Law, 5741-1981, art. 3 (1981), printed in
Copyright, Oct. 1981 (World Intellectual Organization, pub.).
99. For examples of recognition of this right see Copyright Act 1968-1973, AusTL. ACTS
[Vol. 38:287
PROTECTION FOR CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS
(3) the right to prevent one's own name from being associated
with the work of a third party or with one's own work that has
been altered or distorted without consent.10
Paternity rights are of obvious value to choreographers. The suc-
cess of a choreographer's career depends on how the public per-
ceives his works. 101 Thus, choreographers are eager for the perma-
nent attachment of their names to the works that they successfully
present to the public. 10 2 And because choreographic works are so
reflective of the individual choreographer's personality, each chore-
ographer is eager to have only those works that spring from his
own creative process attributed to him.
Moral rights also include "integrity" rights: (1) the right to
prohibit or control alterations of one's works; 08 and (2) the right
P. 1901-1973, § 190(1) (1974); Ireland, Copyright Act 1963, OIREACHTAS ACTS, art. 54(2)
(1963). See also Brazil, Colesdo art. 667 § 1 (1958); Lebanon, Decree Providing Regulation of
Commercial and Industrial Property Rights in Syria and Lebanon, Decree Providing Regu-
lation of Commercial and Industrial Property Rights in Syria and Lebanon, art. 145 (1946).
All of the above provisions are printed in 1 & 2 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES
OF THE WORLD (1982). See also Israel, Copyright Ordinance (Amend. No. 4) Law, 5741-1981,
art. 3 (1981), printed in Copyright, Oct. 1981 (World Intellectual Property Organization,
pub.).
100. For examples of recognition of this right, see Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2 ch.
74, § 43. See also Denmark, Law No. 158 of 1961 on Copyright in Literary and Artistic
Works § 51 (1977); Norway, Act Relating to Property Rights in Literary, Scientific or Artis-
tic Works § 47 (1977); Syria, Decree Providing Regulation of Commercial and Industrial
Property Rights in Syria and Lebanon, art. 169 (1946). All of the above provisions are
printed in 1, 2 & 3 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1982).
101. See, e.g., Poe v. Michael Todd Co., 151 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ("[a]
writer's reputation, which would be greatly enhanced by public credit for authorship of an
outstanding picture, is his stock in trade .... ").
102. Classics of the dance world are often referred to by both title and creator: e.g.,
Tudor's "Pillar of Fire," Taylor's "Airs."
103. For an example of recognition of this right, see Copyright Act R.S., CAN. REV.
STAT. ch. 55, § 12(7) (1970); C. C. art. 2582 (1976) (Italy). See also Argentina, Law No.
11.723 on Copyright, art. 51 (1973); Austria, Copyright Act § 21(1) (1980); Brazil, Law on
the rights of Authors and Other Provisions, art. 25(iv) (1973); Chile, Law No. 17.336 on
Copyright, art. 14(2) (1972); Denmark, Law No. 158 of 1961 on Copyright in Literary and
Artistic Works § 3 (1977); Egypt, Law relating to the Protection of Copyright, art. 9 (1975);
Federal Republic of Germany, Copyright Act, art. 23, 39 (1965); German Democratic Repub-
lic, Copyright Act § 16 (1965); Greece, Legislative Decree No. 2179/1943, art. 15 (1943);
Italy, Law No. 633 of Apr. 22, 1941, for the Protection of Copyright and Other Rights, art.
20 (1979); Japan, Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 20(1) (1978); Lebanon, Decree Providing Regula-
tion of Commercial and Industrial Property Rights in Syria and Lebanon, art. 146 (1946);
Mexico, Federal Law of Copyright, art. 2 (I) (1963); Spain, Regulations for the Application
of the Law of Jan. 10, 1879 concerning Intellectual Property, art. 5 (1919); Venezuela, Law
Relating to Copyright, art. 21 (1962); U.S.S.R., Fundamentals of Civil Legislation, ch. 4, art.
98 (1976). All of the above provisions are printed in 1, 2 & 3 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS
AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1982). See also Israel, Copyright Ordinance (Amend. No. 4)
Law, 5741-1981, art. 3 (1981), reprinted in Copyright, Oct. 1981 (World Intellectual Prop-
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to unilaterally withdraw the work from the public.104
Integrity rights are also valuable to choreographers, who jeal-
ously guard the fruits of their creativity. For most choreographers,
the creative process is difficult and time-consuming.105 The chore-
ographer spends weeks, sometimes months, carefully nurturing his
creation. He regards his work as a child that must be watched and
controlled even after its introduction to the public. Those perform-
ing or presenting the work cannot be allowed to make unautho-
rized changes. But the choreographer himself must retain the free-
dom to revise'06 or withdraw '0 the work whenever aesthetic or
practical reasons dictate.
Legislation enacted under the guidelines established in the
erty Organization, pub.).
104. See, e.g., Propriete litteraire et artistique, C. Civ. art. 543(32) (Petits Codes Dalloz
1979) (France). See also the following statutes, printed in 1, 2 & 3 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT
LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1982), for the recognition of this right: Brazil, Law on
the Rights of Authors and Other Provisions, art. 25(vi) (1973); Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Copyright Act, art. 42 (1965); France, Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Prop-
erty, art. 32 (1957); Spain, Regulations for the Application of the Law of Jan. 10, 1879 con-
cerning Intellectual Property, art. 81 (1919).
105. See supra note 19 & 20.
106. As George Balanchine explained, "I can do with my ballets whatever I like. They
are mine. . . I made them, and I can change them if I want to." DANCEMAGAZINE, Apr. 1981,
at 85. The transformation of Balanchine's seminal ballet, "Apollo," illustrates the extent of
the choreographer's control. Balanchine related, "I was with [Serge] Diaghilev and it was
1927. [Igor] Stravinsky came with a story about Apollo. . . . It was in two parts. The first
part was the birth of Apollo and the second part was about Apollo and the Muses."
DANCEMAGAZINE, Apr. 1981, at 85. When first performed under the title of Apollon-Musegete
in Paris in 1928 the ballet contained both parts and was a critical success. In 1979, however,
Balanchine reevaluated the ballet and decided to make substantial changes in it. "So, slowly
I undressed the muses-I changed things. Recently I looked at Apollo. I looked at the birth
scene. I decided it wasn't interesting. . . . Then I remembered the mountains in the second
part. I thought, Who cares about mountains? Mountains aren't interesting. So I took them
away. . . . You see, all of that is unimportant. What is important is the dancing . . . only
the dancing!" Id. at 86-87. The streamlined ballet represents an even purer classicism than
did the original.
107. That choreographers believe that they are entitled to withdraw works is demon-
strated by actions taken by George Balanchine. When the Pennsylvania Ballet forced its
artistic director, Barbara Weisberger, to resign in February 1982, Balanchine promptly noti-
fied the company that he intended to withdraw his ballets from the company's repertoire.
Balanchine explained that he had originally given the works to Weisberger (a Balanchine
protege), and since she was no longer in charge of "her" company, he did not wish to have
his ballets performed by them. BALLET NEWS, Aug. 1982, at 8. The recent appointments of
former New York City Ballet principal Robert Weiss as artistic director and current NYCB
principal Peter Martins as artistic advisor appear to have solved the problem. According to
Weiss, "when I told Balanchine [about the appointment], he said he was happy for me, and
whatever ballets I wanted, I could have." BALLET NEWS, Oct. 1982, at 9. Balanchine also
withdrew works from the Pacific Northwest Ballet when former NYCB principal Melissa
Hayden left that company. Balanchine reinstated the works, however, when former NYCB
ballet mistress Francia Russell joined the PNB. BALLET NEWS, Aug. 1982, at 8.
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Berne Convention acknowledges the artist's pocketbook and his
pride in his creative talents. In doing so, this legislation provides a
far more effective stimulus to the creative process than does the
current American Copyright Act.
The inclusion of moral rights in the Copyright Act would pro-
vide choreographers with a more comprehensive method of pro-
tecting their works. Yet, Congress has steadfastly refused to incor-
porate these rights into the Act. Legislation providing for the
incorporation of moral rights in the act has been repeatedly intro-
duced and rejected: the first bill was introduced as early as 1940;' 1o
the last was rejected as late as 1981.109 In light of Congress's long-
standing opposition to the recognition of the artist's moral rights,
it seems unlikely that legislative reform will soon provide protec-
tion for the artistic rights of American choreographers.
B. Judicial Recognition of Moral Rights
Although Congress has consistently declined to acknowledge
moral rights, certain American courts have admitted the impor-
tance of these rights as necessary and proper adjuncts to the crea-
tive process. One court recently stated that "[tlhe economic incen-
tive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves as the
foundation for American copyright law . . . cannot be reconciled
with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or mis-
representation of their works to the public on which the artists are
financially dependent."11 Despite the hesitancy of courts in adopt-
ing the panoply of moral rights, they afforded sporadic enforce-
ment of most aspects of paternity and integrity rights."' And al-
108. The Shotwell Bill provided, inter alia, that "Nothing in this Act ...shall be
deemed to alter or in any manner impair any legal or equitable right or remedy of an author
...to claim the paternity of his work as well as the right to object to every deformation,
mutilation, or other modification of the said work which may be prejudicial to his honor or
to this reputation." S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. § 5 (1940), as quoted in Katz, The Doc-
trine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law-A Proposal, 24 CAL. L. REv. 375, 419
(1951).
109. In 1977, Congressman Robert Drinan introduced legislation to give fine artists the
moral rights to claim authorship, and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other altera-
tion of his work. H.R. 8261, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). In 1981 Congressman Barney
Frank introduced a similar bill, which was referred to the Judiciary Committee. H.R. 2908,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Although Congress has failed to act in this area, in 1979 the
California legislature enacted the California Art Preservation Act. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987
(West 1982). The Act prohibits physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of
a work of fine art by anyone except its artist who owns and possesses it. Id. § 987(c)(1).
110. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (citations
omitted).
111. Although the 1976 Revision preempts state law remedies that are equivalent to
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though no court has yet applied the doctrine of moral rights
specifically to choreographers and their works, the principles enun-
ciated in the following cases apply equally to all creative artists.
1. PATERNITY RIGHTS
Early judicial recognition of the intrinsic worth of public
credit appeared in Clemens v. Press Publishing Co.1 2 Although
the court ultimately refused to award the author damages for the
publisher's failure to print the author's name with his story,"' the
court admitted that "[tihe fact that he is permitted to have his
work published under his name, or to perform before the public,
necessarily affects his reputation and standing and thus impairs or
increases his future earning capacity."'" 4
Courts have also acknowledged the artist's right to prevent
others from being credited with creation of his works. In Nelson v.
Radio Corporation of America,'" the plaintiff vocalist had re-
those secured under the Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), state courts are free to adjudicate violations
of artistic rights if either one of two exceptions apply. First, subject matter that does not
come within the definition of copyrightable works (Q 102) is still left to the aegis of the
common law and state statutes. This includes all unfixed works. § 301(b)(1). Those choreo-
graphic works that are not fixed, therefore, remain protected by common law copyright and/
or state law.
Second, state court remedies that are not equivalent to those secured by the Act are not
preempted. § 301(b)(3). The Act fails to specify exactly which state actions are preserved.
However, draft versions of § 301 did set out certain causes that would not be subject to
preemption. The 1976 Senate Bill, for example, sought to preserve the following state ac-
tions: misappropriation not equivalent to statutory rights, breaches of contract, breaches of
trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices
such as passing off and false representation. S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(b)(3) (1976).
Nimmer suggests that under the current act "state laws of unfair competition (of the pass-
ing off variety), or of defamation, invasion of privacy, or the state law of contracts" will not
be preempted. 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 8-248 n.8 (1963). For a general survey
of the preemption problem, see Brown, Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law
Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1070 (1977); Fetter, Copyright Revision and the Preemption
of State "Misappropriation" Law, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 367, item 510 (1978); Gold-
stein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Test-
ing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1107 (1977); Comment, Preemption of
State Unfair Competition Protection Under the Proposed Copyright Revision, 41 U. COLO.
L. REv. 115 (1969). Because moral rights are not included in the list of enumerated statu-
tory rights, it would appear that state law actions to protect these rights will not be pre-
empted under § 301.
112. 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
113. The court denied plaintiff's claim on the ground that he failed to retain the right
to credit when he unconditionally submitted his story to the defendant for publication.
114. 67 Misc. at 184, 122 N.Y.S. at 208 (Seabury, J., concurring). But see Zorich v.
Petroff, 152 Cal. App. 2d 806, 313 P.2d 118 (1957) (failure to receive screen credit for an
unsuccessful film could actually be a benefit, rather than a detriment, to an author).
115. 148 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1957).
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corded certain songs incorporated into an album issued by the de-
fendant record company. Not only had the record company omit-
ted the plaintiff's name from the album, the company had also
wrongfully attributed authorship of songs recorded by the plaintiff
to another vocalist. Although the court held that the plaintiff had
contracted away his right to receive credit on the album, it never-
theless agreed that the plaintiff could require the improper attri-
bution to be removed from subsequent editions of the album.
Courts have further recognized the harm that can result from
incorrect attribution of an author's name to works not created by
the author or substantially departing from his original work."' In
Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios,"7 the defendant attempted to adver-
tise a movie by mailing to 1000 men a sexually suggestive, hand-
written letter bearing the apparent signature of the plaintiff ac-
tress.118 The plaintiff, who had no connection with the writing or
the publication of the letter, sued the studio for invasion of her
right of privacy. The court sustained her action, explaining that
attributing authorship of the letter to the plaintiff imputed to her
"a laxness of character, a coarseness of moral fibre. . . ."I" Such
an attribution adversely affected her good reputation and, there-
fore, constituted an invasion of privacy.
Harm can also result from attributing an artist's name to an
unauthorized, truncated version of the artist's work. The court in
Granz v. Harris12 0 held that although the purchaser of the plain-
tiff's master record discs could lawfully use, produce, and sell ab-
breviated versions of the records, he could not publicly attribute
them to the plaintiff without express contractual authorization. To
do so would constitute unfair competition. Similarly, the court in
Big Seven Music Corp. v. Lennon'2' upheld an action brought by
John Lennon under New York law' 2  for damages caused by the
116. See Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
117. 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942).
118. The letter, which was written on pink stationery, said, among other things, "[w]ell,
I'm raring to go again, and believe me I'm in the mood for fun. Let's renew our acquain-
tanceship [sic] and I promise you an evening you won't forget." 53 Cal. App. 2d at 208-09,
127 P.2d at 579.
119. 53 Cal. App. 2d at 212, 127 P.2d at 581.
120. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
121. 554 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1977).
122.
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertis-
ing purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first ob-
tained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court
of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait
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unauthorized release of an album containing Lennon recordings.
The court acknowledged Lennon's entitlement to compensation for
the release of the album, which was "shoddy and fuzzy, with one
out-of-tune track and indistinct voices in some places . . .,l
2. INTEGRITY RIGHTS
American courts have also noted the importance of artists' in-
tegrity rights. 12 4 As the court explained in Preminger v. Columbia
Pictures Corp.,12 5 "the law is not so rigid . . . as to leave a party
without protection against publication of a garbled version of his
work.""'
The court's decision in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Cos. 127 underscores the role that integrity rights play in the crea-
or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant
shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such man-
ner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last section, the jury, in its
discretion, may award exemplary damages. But nothing contained in this act
shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation . . . from
using the name, portrait or picture of any author, composer or artist in connec-
tion with his literary, musical or artistic productions which he has sold or dis-
posed of with such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976).
123. 554 F.2d at 512; see also Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d
795 (App. Div. 1951); Noone v. Banner Talent Assoc., 398 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Baez v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1964). In Metropoli-
tan Opera, the court enjoined the defendants from the unauthorized making, selling, and
attributing to the plaintiff of Opera records made from radio broadcasts of the Opera's per-
formances. The court recognized the right to the exclusive use of one's own name and repu-
tation and held that unauthorized recording and distribution of the performances under the
Opera's name would injure its good public reputation.
The court in Noone held that the plaintiff vocalist could sue under the Lanham Act to
enjoin his former back-up band from using the name "Herman's Hermits" because that
name had acquired a sufficient secondary meaning to imply that the plaintiff was still asso-
ciated with the group. The Baez court went so far as to enjoin the unauthorized distribution
of certain early Joan Baez recordings under the singer's name. The court reasoned that
these recordings, "made at a time when plaintiff was an immature and inexperienced singer
and guitarist. . . [do] not fairly or at all represent plaintiff's ability." 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 538.
124. See, e.g., Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755 (Cal. Sup.
Ct., 1966).
125. 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1966), af'd, 25 A.D.2d 830, 269
N.Y.S.2d 913 (1966), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966).
126. 49 Misc. 2d at 366, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 599. The plaintiff, Otto Preminger, brought
the suit to enjoin the defendant from cutting Anatomy of a Murder to accommodate televi-
sion commercials. The court held that Preminger had not retained the right to control mi-
nor television editing and, therefore could not complain of the cuts made.
127. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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tive process. The plaintiff writers in Gilliam complained of sub-
stantial, unauthorized12 8 editing of their "Monty Python's Flying
Circus" programs.129 The trial court found that the writers had
"'established an impairment of the integrity of their work' which
'caused the film or program . . . to lose its iconoclastic verve.' ,,'o
The appellate court noted that the truncated version of plaintiff's
program "at times omitted the climax of the skits to which [plain-
tiffs'] rare brand of humor was leading and at other times deleted
essential elements in the schematic development of a story line. '"
Furthermore, the American Broadcast Company's [ABC] broad-
cast represented the plaintiffs' first exposure to an American audi-
ence. In the court's opinion, a misrepresentation of the quality"'
of the plaintiffs' work might well deter many viewers from becom-
ing Monty Python fans. The court therefore held the disputed
mutilations as constituting false representation under the Lanham
Act.'33
128. The British Broadcasting Corporation had granted ABC's predecessor in interest,
Time-Life Films, the right to edit the Monty Python shows for commercial and censorship
purposes. However, the original contract between the plaintiffs and the BBC as the original
producer gave the latter no such rights. The BBC, therefore, was not authorized to transfer
these rights to Time-Life Films and ABC.
129. Twenty-four minutes of an original ninety minutes of programming were omitted.
The defendants claimed that some of the editing was done to make room for commercials
while the rest was done to remove offensive or obscene material. 538 F.2d at 18.
130. Id. (quoting trial court record). Nevertheless, the lower court denied the plaintiffs'
request for a preliminary injunction because, among other things, it was unclear who owned
the copyright in the original program and ABC stood to lose a significant amount of money
if its presentation were enjoined only one week before the scheduled air time.
131. 538 F.2d at 25. The court cited the following as an example of the distortion that
occurred:
In one skit, an upper class English family is engaged in a discussion of the tonal
quality of certain words as "woody" or "tinny." The father soon begins to sug-
gest certain words with sexual connotations as either "woody" or "tinny," where-
upon the mother fetches a bucket of water and pours it over his head. The skit
continues from this point. The ABC edit eliminates this middle sequence so that
the father is comfortably dressed at one moment and, in the next moment, is
shown in a soaked condition without an explanation for the change in his
appearance.
Id. at 25 n.12.
132. There appears to have been some doubt expressed at trial as to whether the cuts
in question had actually had negative effects on the plaintiffs' reputation. The court is re-
ported to have remarked " I thought that was your business, being fools," to which Monty
Python member Michael Palin replied, "Well, on our own terms." Record, Gilliam v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Cos., Civ. No. 75-6256 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1975), quoted in THE NEW
YORKER, Mar. 29, 1976, at 69, quoted in Comment, Monty Python and the Lanham Act: In
Search of the Moral Right, 30 RuTGEs L. REv. 452, 452 (1977).
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, 1123-1127 (1976). This act provides
in relevant part:
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3. CONTRACTUAL MODIFICATION OF MORAL RIGHTS
Although American courts recognize the potential worth of
moral rights to an artist's career, the courts nevertheless view these
rights as subject to the terms of any licensing agreements negoti-
ated by the artist.13 4 An unconditional sale or license carries with it
any moral rights originally held by the artist.13 5 Thus, in Vargas v.
Esquire, Inc.,'5 the plaintiff artist failed in his attempt to gain
credit for drawings that he had unconditionally sold to Esquire
Magazine. The artist claimed that, although the contract of sale
included no express right to credit, the parties had an implied
agreement that the magazine would not publish the drawings with-
out crediting them to the artist. According to the court, the artist
"by plain and unambiguous language completely divested himself
of every vestige of title and ownership of the pictures, as well as
the right to their possession, control and use.' 3 7 Thus, the artist
no longer had the right to demand credit for his drawings.
Similarly, in Pushman v. New York Graphic Society,"' the
court denied the plaintiff's request for an injunction against the
publication of what the plaintiff deemed an inferior reproduction
of his painting. Such a reproduction, the plaintiff claimed, would
cheapen his reputation and the value of not only works already
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods
or services ... a false designation of origin, or any false description or represen-
tation ... and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce...
shall be liable to a civil action by any person ... who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
The Gilliam court stated that the Lanham Act will be violated by a representation that,
while technically correct, creates a false impression of a product's origin. The editing in
question was held to create such a false impression. See also Geisel v. Poynter Products,
Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (unauthorized use of Geisel's pseudonym, "Dr.
Seuss," in connection with the advertising and sale of certain dolls constituted false repre-
sentations of false designations of origin under the Lanham Act).
134. See, e.g., Edison v. Viva Int'l, Ltd., 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1979).
135. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct.
1949). Article 6bi/ of the Berne Convention does not address this question. Certain statutes
enacted under the Convention, however, provide that moral rights are not alienable inter
vivos. See, e.g., Brazil, Law on the Rights of Authors and Other Provisions, art. 28 (1973);
Chile, Law No. 17.336 on Copyright, art. 16 (1972); France, Law No. 57-298 on Literary and
Artistic Property, art. 6 (1957); Italy, Law No. 633 of Apr. 22, 1941, for the Protection of
Copyright and Other Rights, art. 22 (1979); Japan, Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 59 (1970). All of
the above provisions are reprinted in 1, 2 & 3 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATS OF
TE WORLD (BNA) (1982).
136. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
137. Id. at 525.
138. 25 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
[Vol. 38:287
PROTECTION FOR CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS
created but also yet to be created. The court held that the absolute
sale and delivery of the painting constituted an abandonment of all
of the artist's rights, including that of controlling reproduction.
The court's decision in McGuire v. United Artists Television
Productions, Inc.'5 confirmed that the artist's right of creative
control is lost absent express reservation by the artist. The plain-
tiff in McGuire relied on a custom of the film industry that alleg-
edly ensured that the original producer of a film would retain crea-
tive control over the film throughout its entire life. Recognizing
that such a custom might exist, the court nevertheless held that
the failure to insert an express reservation of that right into the
contract was fatal to the plaintiff's claim.140
Some American courts are beginning to recognize the impor-
tance of moral rights in an artist's career. Yet these same courts
steadfastly maintain that moral rights can be irretrievably lost by
those who unwittingly or carelessly contract them away.14 1 In light
of the courts' willingness to enforce such contractual waivers, judi-
cial recognition of moral rights cannot provide choreographers with
the complete and effective protection of their artistic rights that
they so clearly need and desire.
V. CONCLUSION
American choreographers do not avail themselves of the secur-
ity offered by statutory copyright protection because they see no
clear benefits arising from registration under the Act. The funda-
mental desire of choreograhers is the preservation of the artistic
integrity of their works. But the Copyright Act only offers chore-
ograhers economic incentives. Even those choreographers who have
achieved some measure of commercial success derive only limited
benefit from those economic guarantees because every economic
right initially secured by statutory copyright registration can
be-and very often is-quickly conveyed away by the financially
distressed choreographer. Ultimately, only the most successful cho-
reographers, the Balanchines of the world, are financially success-
139. 254 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
140. Contrast the McGuire court's decision to that of the court in Gilliam, 538 F.2d at
14, where the court upheld the plaintiffs' claim to artistic control partly because they had
expressly reserved that right in their original contract.
141. Note also that even statutory moral rights can apparently be destroyed by con-
tract. Although European legislation generally declares moral rights to be "inalienable," Eu-
ropean courts nevertheless allow these rights to be waived or modified by contract. See
Strauss, supra note 97, at 516-17.
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ful enough to realize, retain, and capitalize on the economic rights
offered by the Copyright Act.
Legislative recognition of moral rights could provide an ave-
nue for the enforcement of the choreographer's artistic rights.
Many European statutes expressly recognize the moral rights of
creative artists. Some of these statutes even prohibit the con-
tracting away of these rights.14 2 Congress, however, has repeatedly
refused the incorporation of moral rights into the American Copy-
right Act. In light of this persistent refusal, it would be unrealistic
to expect that American choreographers will benefit from legisla-
tive enforcement of their artistic rights in the foreseeable future.
Judicial recognition of moral rights could present choreogra-
phers with the opportunity to pursue the enforcement of their ar-
tistic rights. Indeed, some American courts have acknowledged the
artist's plight and have been willing to grant common law recogni-
tion to moral rights. A few of these courts have even suggested that
the Copyright Act must be reconciled with the independent exis-
tence of moral rights. " " But these same courts have consistently
held that choreographers can dispose of their economic copyrights
as well as their moral copyrights by contract. By recognizing the
artist's power to waive his moral rights, these courts have reduced
these rights to nonexistence. Because of the uniform resistance of
American courts in recognizing moral rights and because those
courts that recognize these rights allow the unwary to dispose of
them, choreographers would be ill-advised to depend on the courts
for recognition and protection of their artistic rights.
The custom of the American dance community does, however,
provide choreographers with a realistic, effective mechanism for
the enforcement of their artistic rights. The customary rules re-
garding choreograhic rights and the sanctions that enforce these
rules have operated smoothly for a long time. These rules have tra-
ditionally recognized and enforced the artistic rights of the chore-
ographer. Furthermore, these rules continue to recognize the art-
ist's rights to preserve the integrity of his work, long after he has
conveyed away the economic rights to that work. The time-
honored custom of the dance community is therefore an effective,
yet sensitive means of preserving choreographic rights.
Prior to the enactment of the 1976 revision, American chore-
ographers were forced to develop rules for self-governance. They
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 14.
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succeeded in creating a set of customary rules tailor-made for their
own special needs. Then, in 1976, lawyers and legislators offered
choreographers the opportunity to partake of statutory rules osten-
sibly designed to encourage creative endeavors. Instead of pursuing
statutory protection, however, American choreographers have con-
tinued to rely upon their own customary rules. These artists have
eschewed statutory protection because they believe that the deli-
cate balance that they have struck for themselves is at present su-
perior to any mechanism offered to them by statute. American
choreographers have their own "law", and they, at least for now,
choose to be governed by it.
The fact that choreographers have made a conscious choice in
favor of their system reinforces the authority of this custom. For
custom always draws its strength from the consent of those agree-
ing to be bound by it. Thus, for as long as American choreogra-
phers believe in and abide by their self-imposed customary rules,
the custom of the dance community will indeed continue to offer
the best means of recognizing and protecting the artistic rights of
American choreographers.
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